下面的内容小编就先整理这些，更多内容请继续关注小编推荐。
一、目录
[2013.06.01] Urbanisation: Some are more equal than others
[2013.06.01] Drawing the battle lines 保守派vs.改革派：划分战线
[2013.06.01] The strange rebirth of liberal England自由主义怪异重生
[2013.06.01] Martian space flight: Red dreams 火星之旅
[2013.06.01] Killer drones: Out of the shadows 无人机杀手
[2013.06.06] Why so little Chinese in English? 英语的汉语借词太少
[2013.06.08] Lexington: The China syndrome 中国综合症
[2013.06.08] Too much of a good thing 领导人优势过多
[2013.06.08] America’s non-banks: The anointed美国金融机构封神榜
[2013.06.08] Palaeontology: A heroic find 古生物学史诗般的发现
[2013.06.08]Democrat or sultan? 土耳其的抉择：民主还是王权?
[2013.06.08] Luxury in the Arab world 阿拉伯奢侈品市场
[2013.06.08]Turkey's troubles:Democrat or sultan?土耳其受难记
[2013.06.08] Turkey erupts: The new young Turks 土耳其新一代的年轻人
[2013.06.15]Secrets, lies and America's spies 监控网络错在哪
[2013.06.15] Surveillance: Look who’s listening 揭开监控黑幕
[2013.06.15] AIDS in India: The cost of living 生命的价值
[2013.06.15] Europe’s reluctant hegemon 心不甘情不愿的欧洲盟主
[2013.06.15] Energy: Tilting atwindmills 德国能源：无的放矢
[2013.06.15] Online privacy: How to disappear 如何抹去线上痕迹
[2013.06.20] The Big Mac Index goes to North Korea 巨无霸指数走进朝鲜
[2013.06.22] Persian power: Can Iran be stopped? 难道伊朗已经无人能挡
[2013.06.22] China's Bank: the Shibor Shock 中国央行坐视钱荒加剧
[2013.06.22] The start of history 中日战争，历史的开篇
[2013.06.22] Cement industry: Ready-mixed fortunes 水泥业复苏在望
[2013.06.22] Henry Cecil 悼～传奇驯马师亨利·塞西尔
[2013.06.22] Money and happiness: Buy buy love 买来的“爱”
[2013.06.29] Mediobanca: A little less tangled 意大利中期银行
[2013.06.29] Defining financial bigotry: Disparate times 金融偏执的认定
二、文章内容
[2013.06.20] The Big Mac Index goes to North Korea 巨无霸指数走进朝鲜
The Big Mac Index goes to North Korea
巨无霸指数走进朝鲜
Cheeseburger in Paradise Island
天堂岛的芝士汉堡
Jun 20th 2013, 3:59 by H.T. | PYONGYANG
SERENDIPITY is not something the visitor to North Korea is likely to encounter often. Guides, with carefully planned itineraries, usually go to great lengths to avoid accidental brushes with ordinary North Koreans, whether they be women selling clothes or maize in the local fly-by-night “frog markets”, or men drinking in local bars. It is a shame, because such encounters help humanise a poorly understood people: for instance, on a recent visit one 23-year-old North Korean told us shyly that she was besotted with Brad Pitt, which probably went further in busting stereotypes than she could have imagined. Happily, some non-governmental organisations are managing to break through this thick veil of mistrust to foster real engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Singapore-based Choson Exchange, which promotes people-to-people contact between high-flying young professionals and bureaucrats of the DPRK and the outside world, is one. Recently*, I travelled to Pyongyang with them to hold discussions on economics with members of the finance ministry and central bank. From beginning to end, my contacts with those I dealt with left me surprised. Occasionally, I was deeply impressed.
“意外惊喜”不是游客在朝鲜可以经常遇到的东西。因为向导会谨慎地规划你的行程，通常费尽心机也要避免你与普通朝鲜民众意外接触，不管是当地无诚信的“青蛙市场”里卖玉米和衣服的妇女，还是酒吧里饮酒的男子，你都无法接触他们。这就非常可惜了，因为外界对这些民众了解甚少，这类接触有助于让他们的形象更有人情味：例如，在是最近一次访问中，一位23岁的朝鲜姑娘羞涩地告诉我，她很迷恋布拉德-皮特(皮特本人形象很可能比她想象中还要放荡不羁)。可喜的是，一些非政府组织正在设法与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(DPRK)建立真正的联系，打破这层猜忌的厚重面纱。驻在新加坡的Choson Exchange就是这些非政府组织中的一员，他们的目标是增进朝鲜青年精英及DPRK官员与外界的面对面交流。不久前*我和他们一道前往平壤，与朝鲜财政部和中央银行的成员一起讨论经济学问题。与他们的接触自始至终都让我惊讶不已，偶尔还让我刮目相看。
At first, it is hard to know what to make of the North Korean financial authorities. Outside my hotel, a new central bank, about 20 storeys high, was being built on the banks of the Taedong river. Before I arrived I was told the probably apocryphal story that the central bankers themselves were doing the construction work. On one outside wall was painted a slogan exhorting the work to be done “in one breath”—ie, finished quickly, like a military campaign. With the currency tumbling, inflation rising, and growth stagnant, this battle cry is increasingly applied to economics. “Let us conquer industry like we conquered space,” exhorts Kim Jong Un, the youthful dictator, referring to last December’s infamous satellite launch. So when I took my place at the dais in the Grand People’s Study Hall, staring at a few dozen stern-faced economic policymakers in thick coats, scarves and gloves, I thought I was facing the storm troopers of the state-planning revolution. I braced for a very hard time.
一开始，我对朝鲜的金融机构如何构成感到百思不得其解。在我住的宾馆外面，大同河的河岸上正在建造一栋20层楼高的新中央银行。在我到达之前，有人告诉我中央银行是由银行家们亲手搭建的，这故事很可能是瞎编的。外侧的一面墙上涂着标语，激励工人“一口气完成建设工作”——就是快速完成的意思，类似军事口号。由于汇率下跌，通胀加剧，经济增长停滞，这种军事口号越来越多地应用于经济领域。娃娃脸独裁者金正恩鼓励道：“让我们像征服太空一样征服工业”，指的是去年十二月那次臭名昭著的卫星发射。因此当我走上人民大学习堂的讲台时，望着眼前几十位经济政策制定者，每人都穿着厚厚的大衣、围巾和手套，表情严肃，我以为自己遇到了国家规划革命突击队。于是我做好了遭受煎熬的准备。
However, instead of challenging me over The Economist’s view of the world economy, they pumped me for facts—hard facts. Each session ended with notes delivered to me either in English or via my interpreter, with almost desperate demands for case studies from around the world that (I surmised) could be useful for the DPRK. This led to a delicate dance, because discussion of the country’s own economic problems was strictly taboo. The strong wording of the messages themselves seemed to say a lot: “You better tell us in more detail,” said one. “We want more real examples,” said another. The topic of the questions—many focused on inflation and currency-stabilisation plans—indicated where the authorities’ concerns lay. “How do you balance inflation and economic growth,” said one. “What is the optimum inflation rate? What is the ideal level for inflation targeting,” said another. Another: “I’m interested in the real shock-like plan to reduce Mexican inflation in 1995. For example, how did it anchor inflation expectations?” More than once, I told them that if only they had access to the internet, they could find out the answer to such questions themselves. That heretical suggestion was usually met with a blank stare. But they had no shortage of theoretical knowledge about them: once, even my own (non-economist) interpreter was able to improve on my explanation of the causes of inflation.
然而，他们没有就《经济学人》对世界经济的观点向我发难，而是向我提了一大堆问题套取事实——确凿的事实。讲座每告一段落，就会有人递给我纸条(使用英语或借助口译)，极力索取世界各地的案例研究，(我推测是)希望能为DPRK所用。由于在朝鲜讨论该国的经济问题是被严格禁止的，因此他们得在问题中打打擦边球。纸条中的强烈措辞貌似能说明很多问题：“你最好告诉我们更多细节”，“我们想要更多真实案例”。许多提问的主题都集中于“通货膨胀”和“货币稳定计划”——可想而知朝鲜当局担忧的是什么。部分问题如下：“你们如何平衡通货膨胀和经济增长?”，“通胀率多少为最合适?通货膨胀目标制的理想水平是?”“我对1995年墨西哥降低通货膨胀的惊人计划很感兴趣。比如说，他们怎么稳定住通胀预期的?” 我不止一次告诉他们，自己上网就可以找到这些问题的答案，但他们对这个大逆不道的建议往往表现出一片茫然。不过他们丝毫不缺乏这些问题的理论知识：有一次，甚至就连我的口译员(非经济学家)都能帮我补充解释通货膨胀产生的原因。
I went to North Korea armed with some heretical tools of my own. For example, I thought a slide of The Economist’s Big Mac Index would be entertaining, not just to elicit a discussion on purchasing-power parity, but more to discuss burgers. (If you believe the Daily Express, the woman who runs Pyongyang’s only burger bar is Mr Kim’s aunt, and the burgers are called “minced meat and bread”.) Under the watchful gaze of Mr Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, and his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, I presented the Big Mac Index (see picture below). There was indeed a brief discussion about McDonald’s. But far more interesting for the boffins was whether China’s currency was over- or undervalued.
我把自己一些被当局视为异端的工具带到了朝鲜。例如《经济学人》巨无霸指数的幻灯片，我想演讲时谈它会很有趣，不仅是用它讨论对比各国的购买力，我更想讨论汉堡包本身。(如果你相信《每日快报》的说法，平壤唯一的汉堡店是由金正恩的阿姨经营的，并且汉堡包被叫做“肉馅面包”。)于是在金先生的爸爸和爷爷——金正日和金日成——警惕的眼皮底下，我展示了巨无霸指数(见下图)。我们确实也短暂地讨论了麦当劳。但对于在座的专家学者而言，中国的货币汇率是被高估还是低估了，这个问题比麦当劳要有趣得多了。
This quiet obsession with currencies and inflation is understandable. One of the peculiarities of life in North Korea is how ordinary people manage to survive, even in the relatively prosperous capital, in the teeth of a pernicious, de facto dual-currency system. Officially, the exchange rate in my hotel was 100 won to the dollar. At a supermarket selling everything from ping-pong bats to lingerie to bathroom suites (all imported from China), a woman in front of me shocked me by peeling off 110,000 won in notes at the checkout. Then I realised that her (grey-market) exchange rate, secured at a discreet window behind the checkout, was 8,000 won to the dollar. A cup of (imported Guatemalan) coffee may cost a few dollars to me—and her. But to one university lecturer that I talked to, it would represent more than a month’s salary at the official exchange rate—using the won that he earns. No wonder he could not remember the last time he took a girl out on a date. He said he was very grateful to the regime for the supplies handed out by neighbourhood committees, which enabled people to get by with such low salaries. But the inequality between those who have access to dollars, and hence can buy cheap coffee, alcohol, sushi, steak and cars, and those who don’t, is wider than the Taedong river. Many people in my lectures were rake-thin (thought he women were impeccably dressed). I could not find out what they ate for lunch, because we were not allowed to eat together.
这种对汇率和通胀问题安静的痴迷是可以理解的。朝鲜人的生活有种种古怪之处，即使是在相对繁荣的首都，也难以理解普通人是如何在该国的双货币系统下生存下来的，这个系统有很大的潜在危害，官方不承认，但实际上是存在的。在我入住的酒店里，官方汇率是100朝鲜元兑一美元。而在一个从乒乓球拍，女式睡衣到浴室套装(全从中国进口)应有尽有的超市里，我亲眼看见一位女士在付款台剥开11万朝鲜元的纸钞，吓了我一跳。后来我意识到，在付款台背后一个隐秘的窗口里，她(灰色市场)的汇率是8000朝鲜元兑一美元。我只花几美元就能买到一杯(危地马拉进口)咖啡——她也是。但对于与我聊过的一位大学讲师而言，如果把他挣的朝鲜元按照官方汇率换算，他一个月的工资都买不起一杯咖啡。难怪他不记得上一次与女孩子约会是什么时候了。他说他非常感谢政府通过居委会分发物资，让人民收入这么低也能过日子。但是可获得美元的人能买到便宜的咖啡，酒，寿司，牛排和汽车，他们与其他人之间收入的鸿沟比大同河更宽。我演讲的参与者中许多人瘦得皮包骨(尽管女人衣着非常得体)。我无法得知他们午餐吃的是什么，因为我们共同进餐是被禁止的。
Without a doubt, the seminar’s participants were part of a privileged elite—but not that privileged. They wore heavy winter gear in late spring because they were literally freezing cold in the cavernous hall as they sat through the lectures. Only I was given a small heater to keep warm, which was hidden behind the dais. One member of the audience who did not realise I had this privilege came up to tell me that I should put on a coat while I gave my lecture. She also brought me glasses of hot tea. Some people seemed wary of talking to me directly. That made such subtle gestures all the more touching.
毫无疑问，这场研讨会的参会者是享有特权的精英阶级的一部分——尽管特权也不是很大。他们在晚春季节还穿着厚厚的冬大衣，是因为这个大讲堂就像一个岩洞，整场讲座都坐着的话，确实会感到寒冷刺骨。只有我能得到一个隐藏在讲台背后的小型加热器。有一名听众没有意识到我有这个特殊待遇，上前告诉我，演讲时应该披上大衣。她还为我端上了一杯热茶。有些人则显得满腹狐疑，不愿意和我直接对话。因此她这微小的举动，让我感觉特别感动。
The participants were also nothing like as small-minded as parodies of North Koreans suggest. On my last day, I invented a game to enable us to discuss the economic problems of a country like North Korea, without it actually being the DPRK. It involved a country, “ParadiseIsland”, facing a currency crisis, rampant inflation, ailing state-owned industries, falling commodity prices, and an increasingly distant neighbour to the north. It could have been Cuba. It could also have been North Korea. People were divided into groups, and told to sort the island’s problems out. They then had to nominate a spokesman to explain, in English if possible, what should be done.
参加的听众一点都不像讽刺朝鲜的作品中那样狭隘无知。在朝鲜的最后一天，我发明了一种游戏，让我们可以在会场讨论类似朝鲜这样的国家的经济问题，对象也不非得是DPRK。游戏里的这个国家叫做“天堂岛”，该国面临一场货币危机，通货膨胀猖獗、国有工业衰败，还与北部的邻国关系愈发疏远。这个国家可以是古巴，也可以是朝鲜。大伙被分成几个小组，寻找解决小岛问题的方法。他们接着需要任命一位发言代表，解释(最好用英语)应该采取什么样的措施。
Their responses would have made the IMF proud. The first spokeswoman suggested privatisation of the state-owned companies, to raise hard currency, and to foster competition to improve efficiency. Her group proposed raising interest rates to attract inward investment. It argued for time, to mitigate the consequences of austerity on the work force. Another group suggested adding value to the raw materials, by turning them into desirable finished products. A third suggested bringing in multilateral institutions to help tide people through the austerity drive. I could hardly believe what I was hearing. Not least, I was shocked at how freely and easily they were speaking out. One young man approached me afterwards, and joked: “I never realised how much I would enjoy running my own country.” Such interactions serve as a stunning reminder of how valuable, and under-exploited, people-to-people exchanges with pariah states like North Korea can be. Anyone (with access to the internet) can reach Choson Exchange online.
他们的回答足以让国际货币基金组织感到自豪。第一位发言的女子建议国企私有化，以提高硬通货，并通过培养竞争来改善企业效率。她的小组提出通过提高利率来吸引外部投资。他们认为依靠时间可以减轻经济紧缩对劳动力的影响。另外一个小组建议通过把原材料转化为人民群众喜闻乐见的终产品，以此增加原材料的价值。第三个小组提倡引入多国机构帮助人民渡过经济紧缩时期。我几乎不敢相信自己听到了什么。尤其是，我惊讶于他们能如此轻松随意地把这些观点说出来。后来一位年轻人走近我，开玩笑道：“我从来没有想过管理自己的国家这么好玩。” 这类互动可以警醒我们，即使是朝鲜这样的无赖国家，与人面对面的交流不仅颇具价值，还有很多开发余地。任何(能上互联网的)人都可以访问Choson Exchange的网站。.
* My visit was in late March, but because of the sensitivity of writing about North Korea, publication of this post was delayed for a few months.
*我访问朝鲜的时间是三月下旬，但因为内容的敏感性，发布这篇文章延后了几个月。
[2013.06.22] Persian power: Can Iran be stopped? 难道伊朗已经无人能挡
Persian power
波斯帝国
Can Iran be stopped?。
难道伊朗已经无法阻挡了吗?
The West should intervene in Syria for many reasons. One is to stem the rise of Persian power
西方应当为了多个目的而介入叙利亚，其中之一就是为了阻止波斯帝国的崛起
Jun 22nd 2013 |From the print edition
IN 2009 Iran was on the verge of electing a reformer as president. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, subverted the vote and crushed the ensuing protests. Last week the same desire for change handed a landslide victory to Hassan Rohani—and Mr Khamenei hailed it as a triumph.
2009年，就在伊朗即将选出一位改革派总统之时，该国最高精神领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊却推翻了选举结果，并且还对随之而来的示威抗议进行了镇压。上周，出于对变革的同样渴望，伊朗选民把一场压倒性的胜利送给了哈桑·鲁哈尼。不过，这次哈梅内伊没有表示反对，他反而称赞本次大选是一场胜利。
When a country has seen as much repression as Iran, outsiders hoping for a better future for the place instinctively want to celebrate along with all those ordinary Iranians who took to the streets. The smiling Mr Rohani's public pronouncements encourage optimism, for he sounds like a different sort of president from the comedy-villain, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who precedes him. Yet even if his election bodes well for Iranians, it does not necessarily hold equal promise for the rest of the world. Iran's regional assertiveness and its nuclear capacity mean that it is a more dangerous place than it ever was before.
伊朗是一个承受了太多压抑的国家，当这样一个国家看到一个更加美好的未来之时，就连外人也会发自内心地想同那些走上街头的普通老百姓一起为她庆祝。对于乐天派来说，鲁哈尼的公开声明就如同他的笑容一般令人鼓舞。因为，他们从鲁哈尼的讲话中意识到，这是一个不同于他的前任的总统。说到他的前任，穆罕默德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德是一个厚颜无耻的恶棍。不过，就算他的当选对伊朗人来说是一个好消息，但是，这未必就能让其他国家也对此抱有同样的希望。鉴于伊朗在处理地区性事务时的强势以及她的核能力，她必然会成为一个比过去任何时候都要危险的国家。
The case for Qompromise
库姆妥协的前车之鉴【*】
Given the country's obvious weaknesses, that sounds implausible. Inflation is running at over 30%, and the economy shrinking. Inequality is growing, with 40% of Iranians thought to be living below the poverty line. Sanctions restricted May's oil exports to just 700,000 barrels a day, a third of what they used to be; as a result there are shortages of basic goods and growing unemployment caused by factory closures.
考虑到该国的实际情况，这种说法似乎缺乏事实根据。因为，该国的不足是明摆着的：通货膨胀率超过了30%，经济正在日益萎缩。社会不公日益严重，据称，40%的伊朗人生活在贫困线以下。在制裁的影响下，五月份的原油出口量仅为每天700000桶，只相当于过去出口量的三分之一。结果，种种不足导致基本生活用品出现短缺，因工厂关闭而带来的失业人数正在日益增加。
Yet the Persian lion has not lost its claws, nor has the theocracy suddenly become a democracy. Mr Rohani was indeed the most reformist of the candidates on offer at the election, but in much the way that Churchill was more of a teetotaller than George Brown. The 64-year-old cleric has been a loyal servant of the Islamic Republic from its inception. For years he headed the national security council (see article). He is constrained by a system that deemed just eight people fit to stand in the recent election and rejected 678 others (including a former president). The president's power is limited by Iran's other institutions, many of which are in conservative hands.
但是，这头波斯雄狮没有失去它的利爪，而其神权统治也没有在一夜之间变成民主制度。在参加本次大选的候选人中，鲁哈尼确实是最具有改革精神的一个，这就像丘吉尔是一个比戈登·布朗还要坚决的禁酒主义者一样。这位现年64岁的神职人员从一开始就是这个伊斯兰共和国的忠实仆人。数年来，他一直在领导国家安全委员会。 在这个拒绝了678名候选人(包括一位前总统)，并且认为仅有8个人才具备参加本次大选资格的体制中，他的权力是有限的，而在这有限的权力中又有一部分权力要同其他一些部门分享。而在这些其他部门中，由保守派掌权的又占了很大一大部分。
While Iran's politics have probably changed less than Mr Rohani's election suggests, the balance of power between Iran and the rest of the world has been shifting in Iran's favour for two reasons. First, thanks to heavy investment in nuclear capacity by the mullahs, and despite attempts by the West and Israel to delay or sabotage the nuclear programme, Iran will soon be able to produce a bomb's worth of weapons-grade uranium in a matter of weeks (see briefing). Iran has installed more than 9,000 new centrifuges in less than two years, more than doubling its enrichment capability. It is a short step from the 20% enriched uranium that the country's facilities are already producing at an increasing rate to conversion into the fissile material needed for an implosion device. Although Western intelligence agencies think Iran is still at least a year away from being able to construct such a weapon, some experts believe that it could do so within a few months if it chose to—and that the time it would take is shrinking.
正当伊朗政治或许不会像鲁哈尼当选所预示的那样而发生多少改变之时，该国与他国之间的权力平衡却始终在向着有利于他们的一边倾斜。原因有两点：第一，由于该国的毛拉们已经为核计划投入了大量的资金，所以，尽管西方和以色列一直在试图延缓或是阻挠该计划，但是伊朗很快就能在数周内提炼出生产一枚核弹所需要的武器级浓缩铀。在过去的两年间，伊朗一共装配了9000多台新离心机，是其铀浓缩能力提高了两倍还多。从提炼20%的浓缩铀到生产制造核爆炸装置所需要的核燃料，这期间只有一小段距离，而且为了尽快缩短这短距离，该国还早就具备了以更快的速度将20%的浓缩铀转化成核燃料的能力。西方情报机构认为，伊朗离能够生产此类武器还有至少一年的时间。但是一些专家却给出了不同的意见。他们认为，一旦伊朗选择这样做，他们就能在数月内拥有核武器，而且这个时间还有可能正在会缩短。
This makes a nonsense of Western policy on Iran. Round after round of negotiations to try to persuade Iran not to get a bomb have been backed up by the implicit threat that armed force would be used if talks failed. But now it looks as though Iran will soon be in a position to build a weapon swiftly and surreptitiously. Should the West decide to use force, Iran could amass a small arsenal by the time support for a military strike was rallied.
这使得西方的对伊政策就显得相当愚蠢。在过去的数年间，为了达到说服伊朗放弃制造核弹的目的，西方同该国进行了一轮又一轮的谈判。在这些谈判中，尽管西方始终以武力相威胁。但是从目前的结果来看，好像伊朗不久之后又要采取那种秘密制造核武器的立场上去。如果西方真得决定动武，届时，伊朗肯定能赶在西方发动打击之前装备上一枚小型核弹。
Against that background, a friendlier president becomes a trap as well as an opportunity. He may offer the chance of building better relations through engagement and the gradual lifting of sanctions. But Iran could take advantage of this inevitably slow process to build a weapon.
在这种背景下，一位更友善的总统既可能是一个机会，也可能是一个陷阱。他有可能会以双方达成协议或是要求西方逐渐取消制裁的方式，给改善关系提供一个机会。但是，这必然是一个缓慢的进程，伊朗可能会利用这个进程生产一枚核弹。
The other development that threatens the West's interests is happening around Iran. Despite its economic troubles, the Iranian state is a powerful beast compared with its neighbours, and is keen to assert itself abroad. The Iraqi government is now its ally. It has sway over chunks of Lebanon through Hizbullah, the Shia party-cum-militia it finances. And it has sent Hizbullah into Syria, where its fighters have joined Iranian advisers, money and special forces to help turn the tide of the war in Bashar Assad's favour. Ostensibly the reason why Barack Obama agreed last week to arm the rebels in Syria (see article) was Mr Assad's use of chemical weapons; but many believe that the greater reason was his reluctance to see Mr Assad hold on to power as a client of Iran's.
伊朗周边地区的局势也对西方的利益构成了威胁。尽管经济不景气，但是同邻国相比，目前的伊朗仍旧是一头猛兽。他正热心于在国外证明自己。如今，它已经同伊拉克政府结成盟国。它利用得到他资金支持的真主党控制了黎巴嫩的大片土地。不仅如此，它还把真主党游击队派往叙利亚，同那些早已在那里的本国顾问和特种部队一起帮助巴沙尔·阿萨德逆转了战局。上周，贝拉克·奥巴马同意给叙利亚反对派武装提供武器。从表面上看，他这样做是因为阿萨德使用了化学武器;但是更多的人们相信，奥巴马之所以如此是因为这背后还有更重要的原因，是因为他不愿意看到阿萨德作为伊朗的代理人而紧抓着权力不放。
Hope for the best, prepare for the worst
抱最大的希望，作最坏的准备
This analysis may be too gloomy. It is possible that Mr Rohani's arrival heralds a more pragmatic and less aggressive position. The new president used to serve as Iran's main nuclear negotiator, and during his campaign made clear the link between Iran's economic weakness and the nuclear sanctions, and called for better relations with the West. The West should reciprocate, making it clear that it has no intention of impeding Iran's peaceful development. At the same time, it should continue to push for progress on the nuclear negotiations.
鲁哈尼上台后，伊朗的立场或许会发生转变，有可能从进攻性变得更加务实。考虑到这些可能性，这种分析或许就显得过于悲观了。这是一位曾经担任过首席核谈代表的新总统，他曾在竞选期间曾明确表示，伊朗的经济不振同对西方对她的核制裁有关，他呼吁双方改善关系。对此，西方国家应当予以肯定，并且借此表明自己无意于阻止伊朗和平利用核能。与此同时，西方还应当继续推进核谈进程。
But it must do so warily. Any deal offered to Iran should include restraints draconian enough, and inspection intrusive enough, to prevent it from building a weapon surreptitiously, otherwise it would be worse than not doing a deal at all. And such a deal would very likely be unacceptable to Iran.
但是，西方只有在保持谨慎的态度下才能这样做。要想防止伊朗秘密制造核武器，任何提供给伊朗的协议都应当包括足够苛刻的限制，并且还需要为核查留出足够的空间。不然，最后的结果可能会比压根没有签订任何协议还要糟糕。对于伊朗来说，这样一份协议很可能是无法接受的。
The growing risk of a nuclear Iran is one reason why the West should intervene decisively in Syria not just by arming the rebels, but also by establishing a no-fly zone. That would deprive Mr Assad of his most effective weapon—bombs dropped from planes—and allow the rebels to establish military bases inside Syria. This newspaper has argued many times for doing so on humanitarian grounds; but Iran's growing clout is another reason to intervene, for it is not in the West's interest that a state that sponsors terrorism and rejects Israel's right to exist should become the regional hegemon.
由于伊朗获得核武器的风险越来越大，西方应当下定决心介入叙利亚。介入的方式可以有两种：或是武装其反对派，或是建立一个禁飞区。在这两种方式中，建立禁飞区不仅可以让阿萨德手中最有效的武器——利用飞机投放炸弹——失去作用，也可以让起义者在叙利亚国内建立武装根据地。基于人道主义的立场，本报曾多次呼吁国际社会采取这种做法。但是，由于考虑到伊朗的势头日渐强盛，让一个支持恐怖主义并且拒绝承认以色列生存权的国家成为地区霸主不符合西方的利益。
The West still has the economic and military clout to influence events in the region, and an interest in doing so. When Persian power is on the rise, it is not the time to back away from the Middle East.
西方应当趁着自己还有经济和军事实力的时候，在这个地区发挥影响力，并且这样做也符合西方的利益。现在正是波斯帝国崛起之时，西方应当继续留在中东，目前还不是离开的时候。
【注释】 本期封面为波斯波利斯宫殿内的浮雕，其刻画的是狮子斗牛的场景，象征着力量和收获。
波斯波利斯古迹是波斯帝国阿契美尼德王朝的一座行宫，位于设拉子以北60公里处的扎格罗斯山脉的拉赫马特山西麓，建造在南北长450米、东西宽300米、面积13.5万平方米的石头台基上，居高临下，俯视辽阔的法尔斯平原。宫殿包括六宫一殿、椒房、金库和帝后陵墓等建筑。
波斯波利斯是希腊文音译，意指波斯都城，因希腊文的“波利斯”与英文的PALACE相同，也可称为“波斯宫殿”。伊朗人称它为“塔赫特贾姆希德”，即贾姆希德的御座。贾姆希德是伊朗传说中一位古代国王的名字，据说是他首先在波斯波利斯建造了宫殿。
波斯波利斯始建于公元前约518年。波斯帝国的中兴之王大流士一世为了显示王中之王的权威和万国一统的气魄，下令建造波斯波利斯宫殿。大流士时期完成了举行朝贺的阿帕达纳宫和起居的塔恰拉宫，其子薛西斯完成了其余主要部分。整个宫殿的建造历时120年。大流士及其子孙每年春节(即我国春分)在此举行盛大的典礼，接受被征服各国使节的朝贺和纳贡。而公元前330年，亚历山大一世征服波斯帝国，下令烧毁了波斯波利斯宫殿，并将宫中收藏的巨额珍宝运回希腊。
阿帕达纳宫是大流士一世接见外国使节的宫殿。其中央大厅有36根石柱，柱高60英尺。东、西、北三面都有石柱门廊，每一面有12根石柱。厅墙为5米厚的土坯。门为木门，外包金箔，上有飞牛图案。中央大厅四角墙下各有一石龛，每龛中有金、银板各一，上有铭文：“大流士，大王，诸王之王，诸国之王，阿契美尼德族维什塔什卜之子--大流士王说，我拥有的这个国家从萨克斯坦(今阿富汗境内)的索格特到库沙(即哈巴什，埃塞俄比亚境内)，从印度到萨尔德(今叙利亚、黎巴嫩)，是最伟大的神阿胡拉马兹达赐予我的，我和我的王族受阿胡拉马兹达的庇护”。
通向院内的台阶，向北部分暴露土表，已剥蚀风化;向东部分埋于土中，本世纪30年代才发掘出土，保存完好，石刻浮雕生动逼真，堪称艺术精品。台阶的右侧刻着米底和波斯的将领及伊兰士兵组成的卫队。台阶的左侧刻着23个民族的使节，各自手捧贡品，分上、中、下三排，由波斯或米底军官引路。上排是米底人、伊兰人、帕提亚人、ARACHOSIA人(今阿富汗)、埃及人、扎兰人和萨卡尔提亚人(SAGARTIANS，今锡斯坦以西)。中排是亚美尼亚人、巴比伦人、西里西亚人(CILICIA)、斯塞西亚人(SCYTHIANS)、坎大哈人(今阿富汗南部)和索格特人。下排是亚述人、萨尔德希腊人、巴赫蒂亚尔人(BECTRIAN)和印度人。台阶斜坡旁有狮子斗牛浮雕。上部有五队使节：古希腊以东的索库德人、叙利亚和美索不达米亚之间的阿拉伯人、索马里的普提人以及埃塞俄比亚的哈巴什人和利比亚人。
*关于“库姆妥协”(Qompromise)具有以下几个方面的含义
1.伊朗中部城市，位于库姆河畔，紧靠卡维尔沙漠。从德黑兰通往伊朗西南部与东南部的铁路与公路在此分岔。人口42.4万(1982)。为伊斯兰教什叶派的圣地，有该派创始人阿里之妻法蒂玛陵墓。纺织、制鞋、玻璃、陶器等工业较著。伊朗在此“秘密”修建第二座铀浓缩设施。
2. 鲁哈尼1948年11月出生于塞姆南省索尔赫市，早年曾在塞姆南神学院和库姆神学院攻读伊斯兰教法，是伊朗已故精神领袖霍梅尼的忠实追随者。他曾多次被捕入狱。1980年至2000年，一直担任伊朗议会议员。
1989年至2005年，鲁哈尼任最高国家安全委员会秘书，1991年成为伊朗确认国家利益委员会成员，1999年起任伊朗专家会议成员。2003年至2005年哈塔米担任总统期间，他出任伊朗首席核谈判代表，曾与英、法、德三国就暂停铀浓缩达成协议。 3. 2009年9月25日，国际原子能机构说，伊朗9月21日致函这一机构说，伊朗正在建造第二座铀浓缩工厂。这一消息让西方国家领导人恼火。他们要求伊朗立即开放这座铀浓缩工厂以供核查，还威胁对伊朗采取新制裁措施。同时，美国、法国和英国领导人宣布，三国确认伊朗在首都德黑兰以南的库姆附近“秘密”修建第二座铀浓缩设施。伊朗方面对这一说法予以反驳，称这一设施不是秘密，完全符合国际原子能机构规定。11月27日，国际原子能机构理事会会议经过磋商，通过了一份针对伊朗核问题的决议，要求伊朗与国际社会“全面合作”，澄清涉及其核计划中的一切未决问题。决议还要求伊朗立即停止库姆城附近核设施的建设工作，并要求伊朗承担义务，在未向国际原子能机构申报的情况下，不得私自批准并建设其他核项目。这是自2006年2月以来，该机构首次通过针对伊朗的决议。同日，伊朗驻国际原子能机构大使索尔塔尼表示，伊朗不会执行国际原子能机构理事会会议当天通过的针对伊朗核问题的决议。
[2013.06.22] China's Bank: the Shibor Shock 中国央行坐视钱荒加剧
China's Bank
中国的银行
The Shibor shock
上海同业拆借利率飙升
China’s central bank allows a cash crunch to worsen
中国央行坐视“钱荒”加剧
Jun 22nd 2013 | HONG KONG |From the print edition
BANKS do not keep their doors open an extra half-hour just because their customers need more money. But when the banks themselves are short of cash, things are different. On June 19th China’s interbank market stayed open late as banks scrambled to borrow funds from each other. On June 20th the seven-day repo interest rate shot up to 12%, the highest on record (see chart). The Shanghai interbank offered rate (SHIBOR), an average of the rate at which big banks say they will lend, also rose.
银行不会因为客户需要更多的钱而为其加班半小时。但是当银行自己资金短缺时，情况就不同了。在6月19日，由于银行间争抢着互借资金，中国的银行间市场延迟到很晚才收市。6月20日，七天回购利率飙升至有史来最高的12% (见图)。上海同业拆借利率 (SHIBOR)——大型银行的平均拆借利率同样上涨了。
In a more mature economy such a spike would be “very scary”, notes Tao Wang of UBS. In such economies central banks set the interest rate at which they will provide funds to banks. If they keep this policy rate steady, then interbank rates can surge only if banks start to doubt each other’s creditworthiness.
瑞银集团(UBS)经济学家Wang Tao表示，在一个比中国更加成熟的经济体中，这样的增长是很可怕的。在这样的经济体中，央行制定向银行提供资金的利率，即政策利率。如果央行保持这个政策利率稳定，只有当银行间开始质疑彼此的信誉时，同业拆借利率才会上涨。
In China the central bank’s provision of liquidity is more ad hoc. As a consequence “short-lived cash crunches” are not unusual, says Mark Williams of Capital Economics. This crunch began innocuously enough. Deposits were drained by companies paying taxes and customers withdrawing money in advance of the Dragon Boat holiday on June 10th-12th. A crackdown on illicit capital inflows hit another source of liquidity.
中国央行的流动性供给更具有临时性，因此，Capital Econimics 公司(注1)的马克•威廉姆斯 (Mark Williams) 认为短期的资金短缺并不稀奇。刚开始时，此次“钱荒”并未表现出什么杀伤力。由于公司缴税、客户在端午节假期(6月10-12日)前预先提款，银行存款大量流失。而政府对非法资本流入的打击又阻挡了流动性的另一个来源。
The surprise was that the central bank then did little to ease the strain. Instead of printing money and buying stuff, it decided to sell three-month bills on June 18th, withdrawing money from circulation. The amount was tiny. But the signal was clear: no help could be expected from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). Banks with money to spare chose to hoard their funds, worsening the crunch for others.
令人意外的是央行之后并未采取措施来缓解资金短缺的局面。央行并未发行货币和购买债券，而是于6月18日发行三个月央票 ，从而减少了流通领域的货币。虽然数额很小，但它却发出了明确的信号：不要指望中国人民银行提供任何帮助。而有些银行贮备资金以备不时之需，这更加剧了其他银行的“钱荒”。
Why was the PBOC so hard-nosed? It sets an explicit target for money-supply growth and an implicit target for credit growth. These targets are supposed to be consistent with each other and with economic stability. From its point of view, if banks find themselves short of money they must have provided too much credit. That may well be the case. Although straightforward bank loans are under control, banks have simply invented new ways of lending.
为什么中国人民银行这样坚决?中国人民银行负责制定明确的货币供给增长目标和隐性的信贷增长目标。这些目标要彼此一致，有利于经济稳定。从人民银行的角度看，如果银行发现自己资金短缺，那么一定是信贷过度造成的。此次的情况就是如此。虽然银行直接放贷受到控制，但是它们却创造了新的放贷方式。
That is regrettable. But it seems odd to use monetary policy to punish banks for behaviour that the regulator should have prevented. With luck the banks will now slow their lending and conserve their cash, at least until they pass quarter-end regulatory reviews. Some banks, however, may flirt with default. A cash crunch is a terribly clumsy way to curb credit growth. In a more mature economy, a central bank could assert itself in clear, calibrated steps by raising its policy rate. In China the PBOC has instead drawn a line in the shifting sands of credit and waited for banks to discover it.
银行这种创造新放贷方式的行为令人遗憾。监管部门本应禁止这种行为，但奇怪的是监管部门却运用货币政策来惩罚银行。现在，银行将会放缓放贷，贮备资金，如果运气好的话，至少撑到通过监管部门的季末审查为止。有些银行可能会考虑违约。资金短缺是一种可怕的、不灵巧的抑制信贷增长的方法。一个更成熟经济体的央行会采取明确、标准化的步骤来提高政策利率，从而掌控局势。而中国人民银行却在银行放贷的“流沙”中画了一条线，并等待银行去发现它。
注：
1. Capital Economics is one of the leading independent macro-economic research companies in the world, providing research on the US, Canada, Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia, Latin America, and the Middle East and the UK, as well as analysis of financial markets, commodities and the consumer and property sector.
2. 央行如期发行了总额人民币20亿元的91天央票。
[2013.06.22] The start of history 中日战争，历史的开篇
The Sino-Japanese war
中日战争
The start of history
历史的开篇
How the struggle against Japan’s brutal occupation shaped modern China
对日本野蛮占领的抵抗如何塑造了现代中国
Jun 22nd 2013 |From the print edition
China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival.
《抗日战争，1937-1945：求生之搏》
By Rana Mitter. Allen Lane; 458 pages; £25. To be published in America in September as “Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-45” by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; $30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk
AS JAPANESE troops advanced on the Chinese capital of Nanjing in 1937, Zhou Fohai, a senior official in the Chinese government, wrote in his diary of the panic and fear consuming the city. He anticipated the destruction and its implications for his nation: “China will have no more history,” he wrote.
1937年，当日本军队逼近中国首都南京时，中国政府的一位高官周佛海在日记中记述了弥漫京城的恐慌。他估计南京将毁于战火，其结果就是：“中国从此将无历史，”他这样写道。
The devastation that the Japanese invasion would wreak was indeed shocking. But as Rana Mitter shows in his illuminating and meticulously researched new book about the Sino-Japanese war, not only did Chinese history not end with the fall of Nanjing, but in many ways the war helped to create modern China. It was the anvil on which the new nation was forged.
日本的侵略确实造成了惊人的破坏，但正如拉纳•米特在他这本新书中所示，中国的历史不仅没有随南京城的陷落而终止，这场战争反而从多个方面促成了现代中国的诞生，成为一块锻造一个新国家的砧铁。他的这部关于中日战争的著作史料详实，观点新颖，富于启示。
Other historians point to the arrival of British gunboats in the 1830s, when industrialising Europe collided with ancient China, as the dawn of China’s modern age. But Mr Mitter, a professor at Oxford University, believes that the country’s war with Japan was more important because it reduced China to its weakest state. “Suddenly the circumstances of war made the concept of the nation, and personal identification with it, more urgent and meaningful for many Chinese.”
19世纪30年代，正在走向工业化的欧洲与古老的中国迎面相撞，其他历史学家们将英国炮舰来到中国的这一时刻视为现代中国的纪元年。但米特先生(牛津大学的一位教授)却认为这场中日战争更为重要，因为这场战争使中国陷入史上最弱状态。“战争境遇使许多中国人突然有了中国的概念及个人对这个国家的认同感，这对他们更为重要，影响更为深远。”
Mr Mitter may disappoint military wonks hoping for a blow-by-blow account of every skirmish. But this is not a military history. It is about the Chinese experience of war, the origins of the modern Chinese identity and the roots of a relationship that will shape Asia in the 21st century. It is about China’s existential crisis as it tried to regain its centrality in Asia.
米特先生的这本书并没有详述每一场战役的进程，这可能会让军迷们感到失望了。但这本书不是一部军事史籍，它记述的是中国人的战时体验，探讨的是现代中国人身份意识产生的起因，研究的是将决定21世纪亚洲形态的一种关系的产生根源。这本书记述的是中国在试图重获亚洲中心地位时所经历的一场生死存亡的危机。
It is also a story, pure and simple, of heroic resistance against massive odds. China is the forgotten ally of the second world war. For more than four years, until Pearl Harbour, the Chinese fought the Japanese almost alone. France capitulated in 1940, but China did not. Its government retreated inland, up the Yangzi river to Chongqing (Chungking)—a moment that would later be described as China’s Dunkirk (pictured). From there it fought on—sometimes ineptly, often bravely—until victory in 1945.
这也是一本地地道道的故事书，讲述的是一个尽管获胜希望十分渺茫但依然英勇抗争的故事。中国是一个被忘却的二战盟国。在直到珍珠港事件爆发的四年多时间里，中国几乎是独自与日本战斗。法国在1940年屈服了，但中国没有。中国政府撤退到内地，沿长江一直退至重庆。这场大撤退后来被称为中国的敦刻尔克(见图)。中国政府在重庆继续进行抵抗(尽管有时表现无能，但通常还是勇敢的)，直到1945年光复。
One mountain, two tigers
一山难容二虎
Asia has never had a strong China and a strong Japan. Their complex relationship in modern times began when Japan welcomed the West in the mid-19th century while China pushed it away. As Japan modernised, it became a model for Chinese reformers and a refuge for Chinese revolutionaries who opposed their own government’s insularity. Chinese students who went to Japan in the early 20th century included Sun Yat-sen, who led the 1911 revolution, and Chiang Kai-shek, the man who would lead the Nationalist government of China against Japan in the 1930s.
亚洲以往从未有过强大的中国与强大的日本同时出现的局面。两国间的复杂关系始于19世纪中叶，其时日本乐于接受西方，而中国则持排斥的态度。日本成为现代国家后，就成了中国改革派效仿的榜样，也成了中国反对政府闭关锁国政策的革命者们的避难地。20世纪早期赴日的留学生中就有孙中山与蒋介石。前者领导了1911年的革命，而后者则在20世纪30年代领导了国民政府的抗日战争。
But as Japan’s imperial ambitions grew, China was the obvious place to expand. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria, turning from mentor to oppressor. The full-scale invasion began in 1937. Mr Mitter does not skimp in narrating the atrocities; the stench of war infuses his narrative. But he paints a broader account of the Chinese struggle, explaining the history that still shapes Chinese thinking today.
日本的帝国野心膨胀后，显然中国就成为其扩张的目标。1931年日本占领了满洲，一个良师变成了压迫者。全面的侵华战争始于1937年。米特先生在叙述这场暴行时毫不吝惜笔墨，书中充斥着战争的血腥。但他更多地是描绘中国人的反抗，解读至今仍影响中国人思维的那段历史。
Westerners are there as soldiers, missionaries and journalists. Christopher Isherwood and W.H. Auden, both English writers, arrived from the Spanish civil war in 1938. Isherwood’s diary exudes a pride shared by European progressives in the struggle against fascism: “Today Auden and I agreed that we would rather be in Hankow at this moment than anywhere else on earth.” Most Chinese people, suffering the Japanese onslaught without a ticket out, longed to be anywhere but Hankow. Up to 100m people (20% of China’s population) became refugees during the conflict. More than 15m were killed.
当时在中国的西方人有士兵、传教士和记者。克里斯托弗•衣修伍德(Christopher Isherwood)与奥登(W.H. Auden)是两位英国作家，他俩经历了西班牙内战后于1938年来到中国。衣修伍德的日记散发着欧洲进步人士在与法西斯战斗中所共有的自豪之情。他写道：“今天我与奥登达成一致，认为我俩应该留在汉口，此时此刻世界上没有任何地方比这里更吸引我们了。”而此时汉口在日军的猛攻之下生活苦不堪言，大多数中国人想要逃出该城是一票难求，他们渴望逃出汉口，到任何地方去都行。这场战争中1亿中国人(约占中国总人口的20%)流离失所，1500万中国人死于非命。
It is the voice of the Chinese, not that of the foreigners, that gives the distinctive tone to Mr Mitter’s narrative. From the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek to those of national journalists and middle-class Chinese fleeing the conflict, these first-person observations are woven skilfully into his chronicle of the battles and struggles. We all know about Iwo Jima, but who in the West has heard of the defence of Taierzhuang, when Chinese soldiers defeated superior Japanese troops in hand-to-hand combat? Yet its memory will continue to help shape Asian history. We know what Dwight Eisenhower thought at key moments of the second world war, but few have heard of Xiong Xianyu, an army commander who kept a diary of blowing up Yellow River levees to stop the Japanese advance. Nearly 1m Chinese died in the resulting floods. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The water flowed “like 10,000 horses”.
米特先生的这本书之所以读来令人耳目一新，是因为该书大量采用了中国人的原话，而不是引用外国人的描述。蒋介石的日记，中国记者的报道，还有属于中产阶级的中国人逃避战乱的记述，这些都是当事人的亲身经历。作者巧妙地将这些记述揉进这部抗战史书之中。我们都知道硫磺岛战役，但在西方又有谁听说过台儿庄保卫战呢?中国士兵在这场战役中用肉搏战击败了优势的日本军队。然而对这场战役的记忆仍将影响亚洲历史的走向。我们了解艾森豪威尔将军在二战关键时刻的所思所虑，但几乎没有人听说过熊先煜这个人。他当时是一位中国军队的指挥官，为阻止日军推进而炸开黄河大坝时他写下了一篇日记。近一百万中国人死于这场洪灾。他在日记中写道：“我的心一阵剧痛。河水汹涌而出，似万马奔腾。”
The war was seminal for China, and is still crucial for understanding the virulent anti-Japanese emotions of Chinese people today. The country was not just the forgotten ally, says Mr Mitter, but also the one most changed by the experience of war. Britain and America re-emerged into the boom-times of the 1950s. The Soviet Union was pushed to the brink and did not break. But while “battered, punch-drunk” China never surrendered, its old system of governance was destroyed.
这场战争对中国影响深远，而且仍然是理解今日中国人强烈反日情绪的关键因素。米特先生认为，这个国家不仅是一个被忘却的盟国，而且也是一个受到这场战争最深刻改变的盟国。英美在上世纪50年代再次进入繁荣时期;苏联虽然在战争中几近崩溃，但挺了过来。而受到“连续猛击，脚步踉踉跄跄”的中国尽管始终没有投降，但其原有的旧体制已被摧毁了。
The old order, symbolised by Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt Nationalist party, had joined with Mao Zedong’s Communists to fight the Japanese. When victory came in 1945, it was clear the system could not continue. Mao presented a more attractive, less corrupt vision of a new Chinese state (one that he soon betrayed). His victory in the ensuing civil war (1945-49) and control during the cold war that followed ensured that a narrative of the Sino-Japanese war that did not include Communist heroism was airbrushed out.
作为旧体制象征的是蒋介石及他领导下腐败的国民党。为抗击日本，旧体制与毛泽东领导的共产党进行了合作。当1945年胜利到来之时，显然这种体制不可能继续维系下去了。毛勾画出一个更加清廉，更加引人向往的新中国框架。但他很快就背弃了这一建国方略。在随后爆发的国共内战(1945-1949)中毛获得了胜利，再加上随后开始的冷战期间的高压政策，这些因素使记述中日战争，但没有包含共产党人英雄事迹的内容都被剔除。
Mr Mitter’s book rectifies some of those distortions of history. But the ghosts of the war with Japan have never been laid to rest. Chinese leaders still use the past as a stick to beat their neighbour. Now, from a position of strength, how China deals with its old mentor and enemy will be crucial in shaping the region in the 21st century.
这些史书的内容是有失公允的，米特先生的书对它们进行了一些修正。然而死于这场中日之战的人们在九泉之下始终不得安宁。中国的领导人们依然将这段历史视为敲打这位邻居的棍子。现在的中国处于强势地位，中国如何对待这位曾经的老师与敌人，这对于打造21世纪的地区格局至关重要。
[2013.06.22] Cement industry: Ready-mixed fortunes 水泥业复苏在望?
The global cement industry
全球水泥业
Ready-mixed fortunes
水泥业复苏在望?
The world’s cement giants look set for recovery—but will it be durable?
世界水泥巨头似乎复苏在望——但这个势头能否持久?
Jun 22nd 2013 |From the print edition
CEMENT is as vital a commodity to fast-growing economies as oil or steel. No other material is as versatile when it comes to building houses, roads and big chunks of infrastructure. It is a huge business: the world’s cement-makers rake in revenues of $250 billion a year. Outside China, which accounts for half of global demand and production and is mainly served by local firms, six vast international firms—Buzzi, Cemex, Heidelberg, Holcim, Italcementi and Lafarge—together have 40% or so of the market. Yet the business rarely attracts much attention.
水泥和石油、钢铁一样，是对快速发展的经济体至关重要的商品。水泥有多种用途，可用于建造房屋、铺设道路和大型基建，其余材料都无法与之媲美。生产水泥是盘大生意:全球水泥制造商每年收入高达2500亿美元。中国水泥市场占全球需求量和产量的一半，主要由本地厂商供货。而在中国之外，六大国际水泥公司(Buzzi, Cemex, Heidelberg, Holcim, Italcementi and Lafarge)共占全球水泥市场的40%。但这个行业却很少能获得人们的关注。
Many in the industry are happy to keep it that way. The firms that make this most basic type of glue, whose recipe has hardly changed in hundreds of years, are reticent. Cement remains a polluting and energy-hogging business, for all its attempts to clean up a bit. Investors, though, ought to take more of an interest. After a few hard years, with construction slumping in the rich countries, a recovery at last seems in sight. Demand is perking up just as the big cement-makers have all but dealt with the damage to their balance-sheets inflicted by the acquisition spree that made them into global giants.
业内许多公司则很乐意维持这种状况。生产水泥的公司都很低调。水泥是一种最基本的粘合剂，其配方几百年来几乎不曾改变。尽管业内试图让水泥环保一点，但水泥生产依然是有污染、高能耗的行业。话虽如此，投资者却应更加关注这个行业。过去几年，发达国家建筑业衰退，水泥行业处境艰难，如今似乎终于复苏在望了。一场疯狂收购使各大水泥制造商摇身变为全球水泥巨头。当这些巨头处理好因收购而不敷出的资产负债表时，市场对水泥的需求正在增长。
The structure of the industry also makes cement firms shy of attention. Cement is bulky and cheap. It makes sense to produce it in vast plants close both to limestone quarries, which provide a vital raw material, and to customers. Cement is so costly to transport that it rarely travels more than 200 miles (320km) by road, so its markets tend to be local. Barriers to entry are high: a new cement works producing 1m tonnes a year, the smallest worth building, costs around $200m. It is much cheaper for an incumbent to expand. All this means the industry tends towards oligopolies, which periodically attract interest from regulators.
水泥行业缺乏关注，行业本身的结构也是原因之一。水泥体积庞大而又价格低廉，在既靠近提供重要原料的石灰石矿场又靠近客户的大型工厂生产水泥是明智的选择。运输水泥的成本太高，其公路运输距离几乎不超过200英里(320公里)，所以水泥的市场往往在本地。行业的准入门槛也很高：水泥厂要达到经济规模，至少需要100万吨的年产量，但新厂房的造价约为2亿美元。现有的公司要扩大规模则容易得多。这一切都说明水泥行业容易出现寡头垄断，所以不时会得到监管部门的青睐。
A slender seaborne market provides a bit of competition. But only around 3% of global production is traded across borders. Countries with excess capacity and coastal cement works (built mainly to supply home markets by boat) can dump their spare output in nearby coastal states, capping prices there. Prices will tend to be higher, and profits fatter, in places far from big exporters such as China, Japan and Turkey, and in landlocked countries.
少量水泥经由海运进入市场，带来些许竞争。不过用于进出口的水泥只占全球产量的约3%。产能过剩而沿海地区又有水泥厂(主要用于通过海运为本土市场供货)的国家可以将多余的水泥倾销至邻近沿海国家，从而限制了该国的水泥价格。在远离水泥出口大国(如中国、日本、土耳其)及内陆国的地区，水泥价格往往更高，利润也更丰厚。
Though the cement trade may not be global, consumption follows the same path as other more widely traded commodities that have a close correlation with economic expansion. In recent years demand in emerging economies has risen sharply, as they urbanise and industrialise: they now consume 90% of the world’s cement output, and this share is likely to keep growing. In rich countries fewer buildings and bridges are going up, so demand for cement is in long-term decline.
尽管水泥贸易可能不是全球性的，但其消费量却与其它贸易范围更广、与经济扩张关系密切的商品相同。近年来，新兴经济体的城市化和工业化促使其水泥需求快速增长：现在它们消费的水泥占全球总产量的90%，而且这个份额似乎仍在增长。反观发达国家，其兴建的楼房和桥梁数量不如以前，所以对水泥的需求将长期下跌。
For two decades the world’
