大家也可以借此来培养一下写作观点的表达方法，尤其是经济方面的论点和论据都可以借鉴一下。
一、文章目录
[2013.07.01] Egypt: Morsi's choice 埃及总统穆尔西的抉择
[2013.07.02] Using maths to explain the universe 用数学解释整个宇宙
[2013.07.06] Transatlantic espionage: The lives of others 窃听风暴
[2013.07.06]Stem-cell therapies: Prometheus unbound干细胞治疗
[2013.07.06] LVMH and Hermès: Hidden predators 路威酩轩vs.爱马仕
[2013.07.12] New film: "Pacific Rim" 新电影：《环太平洋》
[2013.07.13] The Arab spring: Has it failed? 阿拉伯之春失败了吗?
[2013.07.13] Going for growth 亚洲谋求经济发展之道
[2013.07.13] Children’s intellectual development 儿童智力发展
[2013.07.13] The rising dollar: Green and back 美元的复苏和回归
[2013.07.13] Financial data: Seconds out 金融讯息提前外漏
[2013.07.13] Free exchange: Ad scientists 搜索引擎广告效果研究
[2013.07.13] The economy: The haves and the have-nots 富国穷国
[2013.07.20] Glad to be grey 长白头发是好事情?
[2013.07.20] The triumph of low expectations 不失望只因期望少
[2013.07.20]Bandwagon behaviour 从众行为
[2013.07.23] Britain’s recovery: Hold your breath 英伦复苏路漫漫
[2013.07.27]The Great Deceleration 金砖四国经济大减速
二、文章内容
[2013.07.20] Glad to be grey 长白头发是好事情?
Labour markets
劳务市场
Glad to be grey
长白头发是好事情?
Older workers have fared unusually well since the financial crisis
自从2008年金融危机以来，年纪大的工人得到的待遇异乎寻常的优厚
Jul 20th 2013 |From the print edition
1 THE recession of 2008-09 was remarkable in rich countries for its intensity, the subsequent recovery for its weakness. The labour market has also broken the rules, as new research from the OECD, a think-tank of mainly rich countries, shows in its annual Employment Outlook.
对于世界上的富国而言，2008年至2009年的经济衰退影响巨大。同时引起人们注意的是，危机过后这些国家的复苏之路疲态尽显。而OECD(经济合作与发展组织，这一智库主要是为发达国家的)年度《就业展望》(Employment Outlook)中的最新研究表明，劳动力市场也出现了反常的变化。
2 Young people always suffer in recessions. Employers stop hiring them; and they often get rid of new recruits because they are easier to sack. But in previous episodes, such as the recessions of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, older workers were also booted out. This time is different. During the financial crisis in 2008, and since, they have done better than other age groups.
一旦经济衰退来袭，身处困境的总会有年轻人的身影。雇主不再继续雇佣他们。因为年轻人解雇起来比较方便，所以老板经常会先炒掉他们。不过即使如此，上世纪70-90年代发生的历次衰退中，年长的职员一般也很难独善其身。然而这次情形有所不同。自从2008年金融危机以来，年长雇员相比其他年龄段的员工，受到的冲击则较为有限。
3 The researchers focus on movements in “non-employment” as a share of the total population in three age groups between the final quarters of 2007 and 2012. This measure has the advantage of including not just unemployment, where people are looking for work, but also inactivity, where people are not seeking jobs. Whereas the average non-employment rate in the OECD has risen by four percentage points among young people and by one-and-a-half points among 25- to 54-year-olds, it has fallen by two points among the 55-64 age group (see chart).
研究人员将总人口划分了三个年龄组，分别比较观察了07年四季度至12年四季度，每组“无业人口”与各自人口总数的比例变化。研究“无业人口”的方法优势在于其研究对象不仅包括失业人员，还包括没有择业行为的人。区别就在于前者正在找工作，后者没有在找工作。OECD数据显示，虽然青年平均无业人口比例上涨4个百分点，25-54岁人员上涨1.5个百分点，但是55-64年龄段却下降2个百分点(见图表)。
4 Why have older employees done so well? In some southern European countries they benefit from job protection not afforded to younger workers, but that did not really help them in past recessions. What has changed, says Stefano Scarpetta, head of the OECD’s employment directorate, is that firms now bear the full costs of getting rid of older staff. In the past early-retirement schemes provided by governments (in the mistaken belief that these would help young people) made it cheaper to push grey-haired workers out of the door. These have largely stopped.
年龄较大的工人表现优良的原因在何处?在南欧的一些国家，年纪大的工人享有工作保障的福利，而年龄偏低工人则不包含在内。不过在前几次金融危机期间，工作保障也没有起多大的作用。斯特凡诺•斯卡尔佩塔——OECD就业事务总干事，他认为造成前后迥异的原因在于如今的用人单位如果要辞退年龄大的员工，需要承担全部的费用。过去政府制定的提前退休计划中，把“送花白头发工人出门”的成本的门槛定的很低。政府当时错误的认为这样会帮到年轻人就业，而如今这项计划已基本不再推行。
5 Job losses among older workers have also been more than offset by falls in inactivity, reflecting forces that were already apparent before the crisis. Older workers are healthier than they used to be and work is less physically demanding. They are also more attractive to employers than prior generations. Today’s 55- to 64-year-olds are the advance squad of the post-war baby-boomers who benefited from better education than their predecessors.
虽然年长工人丢掉工作的情况时有发生，但由于求职积极性上升，有工作的年长工人人数反而上升了，这反映出危机之前工人们已经明显地感觉到了压力。现代年龄大的工人身体状况较之于以往健康很多，而且工作对于人力需求也逐步下降。今天，55-64岁的工人算得上是二战后“婴儿潮”的先头部队，他们比前辈接受了更好的教育。所以，与之前几代人的相比，如今这类雇员更容易得到工作。
6 Older workers now have a sharper incentive to stay in employment because of the impact of the crisis on wealth. In Britain, for example, workers who rely on private pensions have been adversely affected by lower returns on their investments and by poor annuity rates when they convert their savings into regular income.
由于金融危机对财富的冲击，年长工人继续工作的目的性更加清晰了。比如在英国，首先是投资回报的减少，其次工人将养老账户余额转为固定收入，年金利率惨不忍睹;工人们赖以维系的私人养老金因此受到极为不利的影响。
7 Many will argue that older workers have done better at the expense of the young. That view is wrongheaded. First, it is a fallacy that a job gained for one person is a job lost for another; there is no fixed “lump of labour”. And second, as the report shows, young and old people are by and large not substitutes in the workplace. They do different types of work in different types of occupation: younger people gravitate to IT firms, for example, whereas older folk tend to be employed in more traditional industries. There are plenty of things that should be done to help the young jobless, but shunting older workers out of the workplace is not one of them.
或许有不少人认为年龄大的工人做得比较好是以牺牲年轻人为代价换来的。这种观点是不正确的。第一，认为一个人上岗就意味着另一个人下岗，纯属谬误;“劳动总数”并不是固定的。第二，据报道称，在工作中年轻人和年长的人在大多数情况下并不是替换的关系。不同的工作岗位，给二者分配的任务也是不同的：举个例子，年轻人就比较青睐信息技术公司，而老一点的人就倾向于在较为传统的工厂工作。当然，帮助新人摆脱失业困境的方法有千千万，但是把老人赶走绝不是其中之一。
译者：cwxsylar
[2013.07.20] The triumph of low expectations 不失望只因期望少
【导读】美国银行界没让市场失望，盈利仍有增长，亏损也属轻微。但这种胜利是由市场低期望的审慎选择迎来的，胜得缓慢，胜得淡薄，胜得无法让人兴奋。现在美国银行界就如一只大型蜗牛，追着蝇头小利就要爬过终点了，但是，这终究是一条慢行道。
American banks
美国银行界
The triumph of low expectations
不失望只因期望少
A world of low growth, risk aversion and regulatory uncertaint
这个世界——增长低迷，风险规避，法规不稳
Jul 20th 2013 | NEW YORK |From the print edition
1 “IT COULD have been worse” was the common refrain as American banks began reporting their second-quarter earnings. Indeed, the striking characteristic of the returns was their consistency. Big and small, local and national, lenders across the country have been benefiting from some common tailwinds. Legal settlements are becoming sparser; the economy is expanding, albeit feebly, and the housing market is recovering; auditors are pushing banks to keep releasing loan-loss reserves; and actual losses are trivial.
美国银行界纷纷开始发布第二季度盈利情况，对此，市场一次次地表示“本来会更糟糕”。的确如此，市场震惊的是，各家盈利情况简直是千篇一律。纵观全国银行，无论规模大小，无论是地方银行，还是国家银行，都乘着共有的东风获利。法律诉讼越来越少;即便势头微弱，经济仍在扩张;房地产市场正在复苏;审计者正推动银行继续发放贷款损失准备金发;实际损失也是微乎其微。
2 But avoiding disaster is not really cause for celebration. Consumers continue to shed debt; companies carry ever more cash. Banks’ pre-provision revenue growth is muted (see chart 1), and there has been no recovery in loan growth of the sort seen after previous recessions (see chart 2). This is so unusual that it may be unprecedented, says Michael Mayo, an analyst at CSLA, a securities firm, and it hardly suggests a good prognosis for the banking system. He predicts that the current decade will show the worst revenue growth for banks since the 1930s. Pricing and margins will inevitably tighten as a result.
但是，避过了灾难真没什么值得庆祝的。如今消费者仍继续清偿债务;公司库存现金史上最高。银行拨备前净利润增长式微(见图一)，债务也没有像前几次衰退过后那般恢复快速增长(见图二)。证券公司CSLA的一位分析师，米歇尔-马由表示这现象很反常，可能将是史无前例的，很难说这会是银行体系的好兆头。他预测，在这个十年的银行收入增长情况，将会自二十世纪三十年代以来最糟糕的。结果就是议价能力和利润将不可避免地收紧。
3 In as much as borrowing activity has shifted from banks’ balance-sheets to the capital markets, some have benefited. The investment-banking arm of perpetually troubled Citigroup did well in the second quarter, as did the investment-banking arm of infrequently troubled Goldman Sachs. Underwriting and advisory revenues rose at both firms. Goldman reaped large gains from its own investments.
由于企业已经差不多不找银行借贷，而是投奔资本市场运作资本，所以几家投行从中获利。对于一直深陷困境的花旗集团，它的投资银行部门在第二季度表现不错;对于时不时被困境所扰的高盛集团，它投资银行部门的表现也不赖。两家公司的证券包销和咨询收入都见涨。高盛从自己的各项投资中获利颇丰。
4 But Goldman’s return on equity was still barely in double digits. Its headcount is shrinking, not expanding. That is typically the single best indicator of an investment firm’s perspective on its prospects. Citi’s return on equity was well below Goldman’s, at 6.5%. Investors will not tolerate that sort of performance for ever. A major source of Citi’s revenue is in emerging markets, where conditions are deteriorating.
但是高盛权益收益率仍是勉强凑够两位数。其人员编制越来越少，而不是越来越多。雇员人数通常最适合用来预测一家投行的前景。花旗的股权收益低于高盛，为6.5%。投资者不可能永远容忍这种业绩。花旗收益的一个主要来源是状况正在恶化的新兴市场。
5 The likelihood that the overall banking environment will improve in the near future is low. Recent rises in interest rates, prompted by expectations that the Federal Reserve will start slowing the pace of asset purchases, will take a toll on mortgage refinancing, a source of revenue that has produced great gobs of money for banks in recent years. It is probably no coincidence that share prices for most financial institutions have flattened in recent weeks.
银行的综合境况在近期得以改善的可能性较低。由于市场预测美联储将开始放缓购买资产的步奏，近期利率有所上升。这将打击房贷再次融资，阻碍银行像近年来一样从中获取大量资金。而大多数金融机构的股价近几周处于持平状态可能不是巧合。
6 Regulators and politicians are still trying to suppress banks’ risk appetite, not whet it. American financial institutions are already expecting to hold more risk-weighted capital in order to conform with the international Basel 3 standards. Worried by the potential for banks to game the calculations that underpin these same risk weightings, regulators this month proposed a higher “leverage ratio”, a blunter measure of capital that reflects the overall size of a bank’s balance-sheet as well as its riskiness. The proposal calls for a 5% leverage ratio at the holding-company level, and 6% at the level of the bank, for the eight largest banks: Bank of America, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street and Wells Fargo.
监管者和政治家们仍然不鼓励并极力遏制银行冒险。为了符合国际巴塞尔协议III的标准，美国金融机构已经在期待持有更多风险加权资本。而决定这些风险权重的计算方法，很有可能被银行操纵，所以出于此担心，监管者于本月建议提高“杠杆率”。“杠杆率”是衡量资本的更粗略指标，能够同时反映银行资产负债表的总体规模和其风险系数。该提议要求八家银行的控股公司执行5%的杠杆率，银行自身执行6%的杠杆率。这些银行分别为：美国银行，纽约梅隆，花旗集团，高盛，摩根大通，摩根士丹利，美国道富银行和美国富国银行。
7 The new numbers will require institutions to fund themselves with more equity, further diluting returns (at least in the short term). Although the notion of a strict capital ratio has its detractors, it has a good chance of being instituted, says Michael Poulos of Oliver Wyman, a consultancy, if only because it is simple. But by increasing the cost of funding for the big institutions, he warns, the rule may push them away from safer, low-priced products and towards riskier, higher-margin ones.
新指标将要求金融机构筹集更多的所有者权益，权益收益将进一步被稀释(至少在近期而言)。奥纬咨询公司的迈克尔-保罗表示，虽然有人质疑执行严格资本率的效果，但是因为它便于操作，还是很有可能被列入制度。但是他提醒道，如果提高了大型金融机构的融资成本，这一规定可能促使它们放弃更安全、更低价的理财产品，而选择更高风险，更高利润的产品。
8 Bankers have not reacted vocally to the leverage-ratio proposal. That may be because they feared even harsher limits, or because they are keeping their powder dry for other fights. Lawmakers continue to circle the industry. In April two senators, Sherrod Brown and David Vitter, introduced a bill that would require the largest banks to increase their equity capital to 15% of assets. It was loudly applauded, and subsequently quietly ignored. On July 11th four senators proposed bringing back a version of the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 that separated commercial banking from investment banking. This idea has also garnered lots of praise and is also likely to be ignored, if only because of the practical difficulties involved.
银行家目前还未回应杠杆率提案。可能是因为他们担心这样会迎来更严厉的限制，或因为他们在储存实力准备其他“战斗”。立法者仍继续设法约束金融业。四月，夏洛德-布朗和大为-维特尔两位议员提出了一项法案，要求各大银行将权益资本提高到资产的15%。该法案曾深受推崇，继而被默默忽视。7月11日，四位议员提议，要像1933年《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》那样，重新分离商业银行和投资银行。这一想法得到了众多赞许，却也很可能被淡忘，也许就仅仅因为实际操作太过困难。
9 Even if these legislative proposals go nowhere, the regulatory environment is poised to become tougher with the Senate’s approval on July 16th of Tom Perez as secretary of labour and Richard Cordray as head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In his prior position at the Department of Justice Mr Perez was an influential advocate of the principle of “disparate impact”—the idea that lending policies can be discriminatory because of their outcomes, even if there is no intent to discriminate. His approval is a congressional endorsement of uneconomic lending.
即便这些立法提案都不了了之，随着汤姆-佩雷斯和理查德-科尔德雷于7月16日经议会批准，分别被任命为劳动部秘书和消费者金融保护局(CFPB)局长，监管大环境也势必会变得更为严格。佩雷斯曾在司法部门任职，当时他宣传“差别效果”原则，颇具影响力。“差别效果”原则是说，即便银行无意歧视，但是若借贷政策造成了差别影响，也视为歧视。他能上任说明国会认同他关于“非经济借贷”的观点。
10 Mr Cordray’s appointment unlocks broad powers for the newly established CFPB, including the ability to investigate and regulate the price and scope of financial products under a new and undefined “abusive” standard. Senate Republicans had vowed to refrain from approving Mr Cordray until changes were made to the CFPB’s underlying structure, so that less power was concentrated in a single director and its budget was made subject to congressional approval. Whatever concerns they had were abruptly waived. Perhaps, like many of America’s banks, they concluded that however bad things are, they could always be worse.
消费者金融保护局是新成立的部门，它拥有的广泛权力随着科尔德雷的上任而得以释放，其中一项权力让该局能够调查并规范金融产品的价格和规模，这些金融产品涉及新型且未经确定的“争议”标准。议会共和党人曾表示，誓不批准科尔德雷上任，除非CFPB改变根本结构，降低单一领导者权力的集中度，预算必须经过国会批准才得通过。 不过无论他们有什么顾虑，都突然间动摇了。也许就像很多美国银行那样，市场总是这么总结，无论情况多么糟糕，这总不是最糟糕的。
[翻译笔记]
1、refrain 作名词 释义之一为：“a comment or complaint that is often repeated: “Poor Tom” had become the constant refrain of his friends.”
2、拨备前利润(Pre-Provision Operating Profi/pre-provision revenue)：指尚未扣除风险准备金的利润，它等于净利润与风险准备金之和。所谓拨备，指银行业按五级分类标准所提取的风险准备金。
3、证券包销(Securities underwrite) 是指证券公司将发行人的证券按照协议全部购入或者在承销期结束时将售后剩余证券全部自行购入的承销方式。
4、《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》，也称《1933年银行法》第16、20、21、32条款作出了严格的分业规定:商业银行不能进行企业股票((相关:理财 财经))、债券等的承销、承购业务，除了购买政府债券以外，也不能经营证券投资等长期性投资业务。
[2013.07.20]Bandwagon behaviour 从众行为
Free exchange
自由交流
Bandwagon behaviour
从众行为
Why missing out on one job application is bad news for your chances in the next
为什么说一次求职的失败对下一次来说是一个坏消息?
Jul 20th 2013 |From the print edition
1 A TRULY informed diner would choose a restaurant based on the quality of the menu and the chef's experience. The discerning investor would decide which company to back after studying the business plan and meeting the founders. In reality, people often copy the choices of others. Diners pick the crowded restaurant over the empty one. Investors go with the company that already has multiple backers.
真正见多识广的食客会根据饭菜的质量和厨师的经验来选择餐馆，有眼光的投资者会在研究了商业计划并同创始人会面之后才决定投资哪家公司。但在实际生活中，人们却经常原封不动地照搬别人的选择：就餐者常去顾客盈门的餐馆，而不去那些没人光顾的地方，投资者好选择那些早已被大多数人所看好的公司。
2 Such bandwagon effects are not necessarily irrational. Often, the buyer knows less about a product than the seller; the collective wisdom of the crowd can correct for such “asymmetric information”. It can also be a way of coping with a surplus of choice: rather than study 100 models of music player, why not assume the market has already figured out the duds?
此类从众效应不一定是非理性的。一般来说，买方对商品的了解要少于卖方，而大众的集体智慧却可以作为这种“不对称信息”的修正而存在。除此之外，当选择对象过剩时，集体智慧还可以作为一种应对方法而存在：与其去比较100种不同型号的音乐播放机，为什么不假设那些不实用的型号已被市场淘汰了呢?
3 The existence of bandwagon behaviour can be hard to prove. A product or an asset usually becomes popular (or unpopular) in the first place because it is genuinely superior (or inferior). But some have tried to isolate the self-fulfilling effects of popularity. One 2004 study by Alan Sorensen, now of the University of Wisconsin, examined accidental omissions from the New York Times bestseller list. By comparing the sales of books that did make the list and unlisted books that should have, the author could isolate the effect of inclusion—a modest boost to first-time authors' sales. In a 2008 study by Matthew Salganik of Princeton University and Duncan Watts, now at Microsoft Research, participants tricked into believing a song was more popular than it actually was were more likely to download it.
从众行为的存在自有其存在的道理。一种商品或者一类资产之所以通常从一开始就被众人所接受(或者不受欢迎)，是因为它们确实要比别的商品或者资产更好(或者不如别的商品和资产)。但是，有人一直在尝试着把从众行为的这种自我实现效应同从众行为本身分离开来。现执教于威斯康星大学的Alan Sorensen曾在2004年进行过一项研究。在那项研究中，他对被《纽约时报》畅销书排行榜偶然遗漏的书籍进行了分析。通过对比上榜书籍以及本应上榜却被遗漏的书籍的销量，Alan Sorensen分离出了“入选效应”。也就是说，对于一个首次上榜的作者，他的书籍的销量会因之而出现少许的增加。普林斯顿大学的Matthew Salganik和现于微软研究所工作的Duncan Watts在2008年进行的一项研究显示，当参与者因盲从人言而相信一首歌曲比实际还要流行时，那么他下载这首歌曲的可能性就会更大。
4 Scholars are now asking whether herd behaviour also prevails in labour markets. Although the number of long-term unemployed in America is coming down (see left-hand chart above), it is still near an all-time high. Such workers may simply be losing out to candidates with more qualifications or experience for the jobs that come open. A more ominous possibility is that long-term unemployment is at least partly self-fulfilling: employers may be reluctant to hire someone others have already passed over.
如今，学者们正在研究的是：羊群效应是否也在劳动力市场中占有一席之地?尽管美国长期失业人数正处于下降之中(如左上图表所示)，但是仍旧处在历史最高点附近。长期失业者有可能会在工作机会来临时输给那些具有更多资历或者更多经验的应聘者。这是一种更悲观的解释。它认为，长期失业至少具有部分自我实现效应。其具体表现是，雇主可能不太情愿去雇佣那些早已被别人挑剩下了的应聘者。
5 To find out, Kory Kroft of the University of Toronto, Fabian Lange of McGill University and Matthew Notowidigdo of the University of Chicago devised an experiment in which they applied for 3,000 clerical, administrative, sales and customer-service jobs advertised online by submitting 12,000 fictitious cvs. The submissions were designed so that applicants with similar backgrounds, education and experience went for the same job. The only difference was how long the applicant had been jobless, a period that ranged from no time at all to as much as 36 months.
为了证明这种看法，多伦多大学的Kory Kroft、麦吉尔大学的Fabian Lange和芝加哥大学的Matthew Notowidigdo设计了一项实验。在这项实验中，他们利用提交12000份伪造的简历的办法，申请了由在线广告发布的3000个职位，这些职位包括办事员、管理人员、销售人员以及客户服务人员。被提交的求职申请都遵循了同一个设计原则，其目的就是要使具有相似背景、学历和经验的申请者都去申请同一份工作。唯一区别在于，应聘者失业的时间长短不一样，从根本没有失业过到已经失业达36个月之久不等。
6 Creating cover identities worthy of the CIA, the researchers assigned the fictitious applicants local phone numbers bought for the experiment, as well as e-mail addresses. They found that the odds of an applicant being called back by an employer declined steadily as the duration of unemployment rose, from 7.4% after one month without work down to 4-5% at the eight-month mark, where the call-back rate stabilised (see right-hand chart above).
为了使假身份足以达到CIA的水准，研究人员在伪造的申请书上分别写上了专为此次实验而买来的当地电话号码以及电子邮件地址。他们发现，一份求职表得到雇主回应的几率会随着失业时间的增加而呈现出稳定下降的态势。也就是说，失业者在失去工作一个月后得到雇主回应的比率为7.4%，随后失业者得到雇主回应的比率开始稳步减少，当失业时间增加到8个月以后，回应率会稳定在4%-5%之间(如右上图表所示)。
7 These results, the authors say, cannot be because employers found some qualitative flaw in the longer-term unemployed that was hidden from outsiders, since the applicants were similar in other respects. Another explanation for long-term unemployment—that people make less effort to find work as their time out of the labour force lengthens—is also not applicable here.
研究人员认为，之所以会出现这种情况，不可能是因为雇主没有在长期失业人员的简历中发现了什么别人看不出来的质的问题，因为这些简历除了持续失业时间之外其它的并无不同。另一种解释认为，随着失业时间的增加，长期没有工作消弱了人们找工作的动力。不过，这种解释也不适用于这种情况。
8 A third possibility is that employers equate lengthening unemployment with atrophying skills and thus falling productivity. But this should be true whether the economy is booming or in recession. The decline in call-back rates was much more pronounced in cities with tight labour markets; call-back rates changed relatively little when higher unemployment prevailed locally. From this, the authors infer that employers are more likely to overlook a long period of unemployment if overall economic conditions are stacked against candidates.
第三种解释认为，雇主将失业时间的增加等同于工作技能的倒退。因此，在他们看来，失业者的生产效率也必然会随之而下降。不管经济是处于繁荣期还是衰退期，这种解释都应该是正确的。在城市中，当劳动力供大于求时，雇主回应率的下降幅度非常明显;当失业率升高时，雇主回应率的变化则相对较小。研究人员由此得出了这样一个结论：如果经济的总体状况不利于应聘者，那么雇主忽视那些出于长时间失业状态的人的可能性就越大。
9 These results strongly suggest that long-term unemployment is at least partly self-fulfilling. Like patrons who avoid restaurants purely because they are empty, employers were reluctant to hire someone other employers didn't want.
这些研究成果明白无误地表明，长期失业至少存在着部分自我实现的特性。这就如同那些纯粹因为餐馆门庭冷落而避免去此类地方的常客一样，雇主在雇佣劳动力时也不太愿意雇佣那些别人不想要的人。
Herd it through the grapevine
让从众行为为己所用
10 Although such bandwagon behaviour may be rational, it can also be deeply harmful. Two decades ago Abhijit Banerjee, now at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, devised a model of “rational herding” in which market participants base their decision on a combination of their own information and the actions of others. Over successive rounds of transactions, participants responded less to their own information and more to the herd.
尽管此类从众行为可能是理性的，但是它也可能具有巨大的危害性。现执教于麻省理工的Abhijit Banerjee曾在20年前设计了一个“理性从众行为”模型的实验。在那次试验中，市场参与者的判断是在结合了自身意见和他人选择的基础上做出的。实验显示，在经过了连续几轮的相互权衡后，参与者在作出反应时，减少了基于自己信息的判断，增加了对群体效应的盲从。
11 That can lead to poor outcomes. Imagine a newly unemployed worker who narrowly misses out on the first job he applies for. That initial failure reduces his odds of landing the second job he applies for, and so on, until he ends up as one of the long-term unemployed. The growth of cv-screening software may exacerbate the trend by reducing the chances that someone in human resources will pull the details of a long-term unemployed worker out of the pile of applications. One near miss can increase the odds of protracted failure.
这个实验考诉我们，理性从众行为可以导致恶劣的后果。想象一下：如果一个刚刚失业的工人在第一次求职时最后功亏一篑，那么这次最初的失败就会减少他在第二次求职时获得工作的几率。以此类推，最后他不得不接受自己成为一个长期失业者的现实。由于简历筛选软件降低了人力资源部门的职员从一大堆求职申请中抽出长期失业者求职细节的机会，因此它的出现可能会助长这种趋势。一次的功亏一篑可能会增加连续失败的几率。
12 Popularity is not destiny, fortunately. Mr Salganik and Mr Watts could turn an unpopular song into a hit by manipulating its perceived popularity, but could not turn a hit into a loser. Even after being falsely labelled the least popular song, the most popular song rose sharply in the rankings once enough people had listened to it. Similarly, Messrs Kroft, Lange and Notowidigdo found that even someone who has been unemployed for several years has a 4% chance of a call-back. But their study suggests that taking some work is better than none for the recently unemployed. Once the bandwagon starts to roll, it is hard to stop.
值得庆幸的是，不受欢迎并不是一种宿命。Salganik和Watts可以利用复制先前成功的方法将一首名不见经传的歌曲推上排行榜，但是却不能将一首上榜歌曲变成一首不受欢迎的歌曲。即便是最受欢迎的歌曲被错误地贴上了最不受欢迎的标签，只要听这首歌曲的人足够多，它仍然可以迅速地上榜。同样，Kroft、Lange和Notowidigdo也发现，即便是失去工作长达数年之久的失业者也存在着得到雇主回应的机会，他们的成功率约为4%。但是，这种的研究成果也在提醒那些刚刚失业的人，为了避免今后长期失业，最好在失业后迅速找到一份工作。一旦“随大流”成为成为潮流，其势头是难以阻挡的。
[2013.07.23] Britain’s recovery: Hold your breath 英伦复苏路漫漫
【导读】英国GDP增长出现曙光?展望前途，路漫漫其修远……
有诗叹曰：
经济季涨点六零，
财相房主笑盈盈。
低息贷款有保障?
遥望坎尼言与行。
又曰：
英伦复苏路漫漫，
政府选民泪未干。
低息保证有纸笔?
传语或可保平安?
Britain’s recovery
英伦复苏路漫漫
Hold your breath
屏住呼吸
If they could, the Conservatives might bring forward the election
如果可以的话，保守党或许会提前举行大选
Jul 27th 2013 |From the print edition
ANY electioneer worth his salt knows the importance of timing. Voters have short memories, so good news is better if it comes shortly before polling day. Given Britain’s bottom-of-table economic performance over the past three years, the coalition government knows that providing economic comfort before the next election is essential. Conservative and Lib Dem MPs will be relieved that GDP grew by 0.6% in the second quarter of 2013, an annual rate of 2.4%. But they should worry about how long the good feeling will last.
任何称职的竞选活动分子都知道选择时机的重要性。选民记性不好，因此在选举日在望时出笼的好消息更能起到正面作用。考虑到最近三年来英国经济的垫底表现，联合政府很清楚，在下次大选之前让人们对经济感到满意是获胜的关键。GDP在2013年第二季度增长了0.6%，按年度计算为2.4%，这会让保守党和自民党议员们感到宽慰。但他们应该为这样的好心情能够持续多久感到担忧。
The economic endowment handed to George Osborne, the Tory chancellor, in 2010 was dreadful—and politically crippling. Any chancellor who inherited the widest peacetime deficit on record and a debt-to-GDP ratio north of 65% could not provide much of a fiscal boost. But his brand of austerity—holding down investment to spare the fattest parts of the state—did not help. It means austerity will last well into the next parliament. There will be no election-winning stimulus.
2010年，保守党财相乔治•奥斯本(George Osborne)不但接下了一个糜烂透顶的摊子，而且在政治上也受到重重掣肘。任何一位财相，如果他的前任给他留下了创非战时纪录的国际收支赤字和大于GDP 65%的举债率，都不大可能放手提供财政刺激。但奥斯本风格的紧缩——即为保全国家体制内花销最大的部分而压制投资——却于事无补。上述举措意味着，紧缩将在议会换届后许久依然故我。不会为赢得竞选而推出刺激经济的举措。
Yet loose monetary policy is finally starting to work. Mortgage rates are down, giving home owners more disposable income. More generous loans are available to new buyers, boosting demand. House prices have risen by 2% in a year, according to Nationwide, a lender. Rises in London and the south-east have been greater. Naysayers warn of a housing bubble. But Sebastian Graves, an economist at Goldman Sachs, says houses may be undervalued in Britain. In a recent paper Mr Graves calculates the “fair” value of a house using a technique that investors apply to valuing companies. Rental rates are akin to the “payout” a house gives each year; they are high. Mortgage rates are the cost of funding the house; they are low. Put together, the economically fair price appears loftier even than current market values.
然而，宽松的货币政策终于初见成效。按揭利率继续走低，这给了房屋拥有者们更多的可支配收入。新购房者可以得到条件更优的贷款，从而刺激了需求。根据按揭社“全国联盟”(Nationwide)的统计，英国房价在一年中上扬了2%，伦敦与英格兰东南地区的上涨更是高于此数。反对派在警告房屋泡沫的可能性;但高盛(Goldman Sachs)的经济学家塞巴斯蒂安•格拉夫斯(Sebastian Graves)认为，英国的房价或许还低于合理价位。在最近的一篇文章中，格拉夫斯用投资者用来对公司估价的一种方法计算了房屋的“合理”价值。租金率高企不下，它们与每所房屋每年的收益相关。按揭利率低，它们是为购房提供资金的花费。二者结合，合乎经济规律的公平价值似乎高于当前的市场价值。
British shoppers apparently feel the same way: consumer confidence has risen sharply in recent months. Since the measure is closely correlated with consumer spending—which accounts for two-thirds of output—there may be more decent GDP numbers on the way. As Britons feel wealthier, they spend more.
英国购物者显然也有同感：消费者信心最近几个月连连爆棚。这一测度与消费者花销密切相关，而后者占生产总量的三分之二，因此更高的GDP增长或许即将来临。一旦英国人感觉自己的钱包鼓了些，他们花起钱来就会更为大手大脚。
But the recovery remains skin-deep. The bones of Britain’s economy are rotten. Shoppers are consuming not because they earn more but because they can borrow more. Established firms with cash in hand are hoarding rather than investing. New firms with ideas but no funding find it hard to borrow: the banks will lend only against property. Britain still buys far more abroad than it sells, despite a weak currency.
但复苏程度仍旧十分肤浅。英国经济已经烂到骨子里了。购物者的消费增加并不是因为他们挣得多了，而是因为他们更容易借钱了。手中资金充裕的知名公司正在积聚钱财而不是投资。有想法但缺资金的新公司发现它们很难借贷：银行只是在有资产抵押的时候才肯借钱。尽管英镑疲软，英国现在的出口额还远小于进口额。
At some point, these deeper problems will surface. They hazard the housing-fuelled recovery. For a start, Mr Graves’s argument works in both directions: the fair price for houses will fall when interest rates rise. The fact that Mark Carney, the Bank of England’s governor, is widely expected to commit to keeping interest rates low will provide some comfort. But the bank cannot completely control the interest rates that consumers pay. A low-rate future is hardly guaranteed, whatever Mr Carney promises.
这些现在还隐藏在深层的问题迟早会浮出水面。它们会威胁由房市刺激的复苏。重要的是，格拉夫斯的理论在另一方面也成立：房屋的合理价值将在银行利率上涨时下跌。人们广泛认为英国央行行长马克•坎尼(Mark Carney)会致力于保持银行低利率，这一事实将让人们感到宽慰。但央行无法完全控制消费者所支付的利率。无论坎尼会答应些什么，未来的低利率都未必有保证。
In economics the future is always murky, and it becomes murkier the further forward you try to look. If they were not constrained by the coalition agreement, the Conservatives might well think of calling an election in 2014. History provides a worrying precedent that Mr Osborne will know well. If James Callaghan had called an election in 1978, the Labour prime minister could have been re-elected. He waited, the economy tanked and Margaret Thatcher swept to power in 1979. The long wait until 2015 gives Britain’s deeper problems more time to strangle its fragile recovery. Mr Osborne will have to hope that the good news has not come too soon.
经济学说到将来的情况都很模糊，如果你试图看得更远，那就更模糊了。如果没有联合政府协议约束的话，保守党很可能会考虑在2014年举行大选。历史上曾经有过一个令人担心的先例，对此奥斯本一定知道得很清楚。如果詹姆斯•卡拉汉(James Callaghan)1 提前在1978年举行大选，这位工党前首相有可能再度当选。但他等到了1979年，结果经济突然垮了，而玛格丽特•撒切尔在那一年的选举中大获全胜。如果下次大选如期于2015年举行，英国的隐藏问题有了这样长的等待时间，就更有可能绞杀该国脆弱的复苏。奥斯本只有寄希望于好消息姗姗来迟。
1. 伦纳德•詹姆斯•卡拉汉，KG，PC(Leonard James Callaghan, Baron Callaghan of Cardiff，1912年3月27日—2005年3月26日)，英国工党政治家，1976年至1979年出任英国首相。“
[2013.07.27]The Great Deceleration 金砖四国经济大减速
Emerging economies
新兴经济体
The Great Deceleration
经济大减速
The emerging-market slowdown is not the beginning of a bust. But it is a turning-point for the world economy
新兴市场减速不是经济大萧条的起点，而是世界经济的转折点
WHEN a champion sprinter falls short of his best speeds, it takes a while to determine whether he is temporarily on poor form or has permanently lost his edge. The same is true with emerging markets, the world economy's 21st-century sprinters. After a decade of surging growth, in which they led a global boom and then helped pull the world economy forwards in the face of the financial crisis, the emerging giants have slowed sharply.
如果一个冠军短跑选手跑不出自己的巅峰成绩，我们需要假以时日才能确定这到底是因为暂时的身体欠佳，还是因为永久的锋芒不再。新兴市场算得上21世纪世界经济短跑健将，所以它们的情况也是如此。十年以来，新型经济巨头一直保持高速增长：先是引领全球经济繁荣，后是顶住金融危机的压力拉着世界经济向前发展，但是如今，各大新兴经济体增速明显放缓。
China will be lucky if it manages to hit its official target of 7.5% growth in 2013, a far cry from the double-digit rates that the country had come to expect in the 2000s. Growth in India (around 5%), Brazil and Russia (around 2.5%) is barely half what it was at the height of the boom. Collectively, emerging markets may (just) match last year's pace of 5%. That sounds fast compared with the sluggish rich world, but it is the slowest emerging-economy expansion in a decade, barring 2009 when the rich world slumped.
就2013年度，中国如果能设法达到官方设定的7.5%目标增速就万幸了，而这个增速比起2000-2010年间中国预期实现的两位数增速，已经差得远了。如今，印度的增速为5%，巴西和俄罗斯的在2.5%左右，这勉强是它们各自巅峰时期的一半。新兴市场的总体增速可能刚刚和去年差不多，达到5%。比起滞慢的发达国家，这增速听起来已经很快了，但是这却是除去发达国家金融暴跌的2009年外，十年以来新兴经济体的最缓慢的扩张。
This marks the end of the dramatic first phase of the emerging-market era, which saw such economies jump from 38% of world output to 50% (measured at purchasing-power parity, or PPP) over the past decade. Over the next ten years emerging economies will still rise, but more gradually. The immediate effect of this deceleration should be manageable. But the longer-term impact on the world economy will be profound.
这标记着新兴市场时期轰轰烈烈的第一阶段终结了。在过去的十年里，新兴经济体占全球产出的比值由38%跃至50%(以购买力平价计算)。在未来的十年里，它们仍会发展提高，但是速度会更缓慢些。这次经济减速，就短期来看，应该应付得过来;但是就长期来说，会对于世界经济产生深远的影响。
Running out of puff
动力不足
In the past, periods of emerging-market boom have tended to be followed by busts (which helps explain why so few poor countries have become rich ones). A determined pessimist can find reasons to fret today, pointing in particular to the risks of an even more drastic deceleration in China or of a sudden global monetary tightening. But this time a broad emerging-market bust looks unlikely.
在过去，新兴市场的繁荣期过后，总会迎来萧条期。这也就是为什么鲜有发展中国家蜕变为发达国家。顽固的悲观论总能找到理由焦虑，他们尤其担心中国经济急剧减速，或全球金融突然紧缩所带来的风险。但是就目前来说，新兴市场发生全面崩盘的可能性较低。
China is in the midst of a precarious shift from investment-led growth to a more balanced, consumption-based model. Its investment surge has prompted plenty of bad debt. But the central government has the fiscal strength both to absorb losses and to stimulate the economy if necessary. That is a luxury few emerging economies have ever had. It makes disaster much less likely. And with rich-world economies still feeble, there is little chance that monetary conditions will suddenly tighten. Even if they did, most emerging economies have better defences than ever before, with flexible exchange rates, large stashes of foreign-exchange reserves and relatively less debt (much of it in domestic currency).
中国正身处于从投资推动型向更均衡的消费推动型转变，这段时期充满了不确定因素。中国投资迅猛增长催生了诸多不良贷款。但是中央政府仍有足够财政实力，既能吸收损失，同时又能在必要的时候采取措施刺激增长。这种奢侈行为其他新兴经济体很难做到。这大大降低了发生经济灾难的可能性。且发达经济体仍然疲软，所以货币政策突然收紧的可能性不大。即便是突然紧缩了，大多新兴经济体都采用了灵活汇率，坐拥大量外汇储备，且负债也相对较少(大多都是本国国债)，所以它们如今的防御能力也是史上最强的。
That's the good news. The bad news is that the days of record-breaking speed are over. China's turbocharged investment and export model has run out of puff. Because its population is ageing fast, the country will have fewer workers, and because it is more prosperous, it has less room for catch-up growth. Ten years ago China's per person GDP measured at PPP was 8% of America's; now it is 18%. China will keep on catching up, but at a slower clip.
这是好消息。坏消息就是实现破纪录增速的时代已经过去。中国动力十足的投资和出口模式已经累得上气不接下气。由于人口迅速老龄化，中国的劳动力会减少;由于繁荣程度更高，中国的赶超式增长空间也会缩小。十年前，中国以购买力平价计算的人均GDP为美国的8%;如今是美国的18%。中国会继续赶超发展，但是速度会减慢。
That will hold back other emerging giants. Russia's burst of speed was propelled by a surge in energy prices driven by Chinese growth. Brazil sprinted ahead with the help of a boom in commodities and domestic credit; its current combination of stubborn inflation and slow growth shows that its underlying economic speed limit is a lot lower than most people thought. The same is true of India, where near-double-digit annual rises in GDP led politicians, and many investors, to confuse the potential for rapid catch-up (a young, poor population) with its inevitability. India's growth rate could be pushed up again, but not without radical reforms—and almost certainly not to the peak pace of the 2000s.
中国的减速也会拉其他巨型新兴经济体的后腿。中国经济增长推动了能源价格高涨，由此驱动了俄罗斯的井喷式发展。商品和国内信贷繁荣也让巴西的经济全力冲刺;如今该国通胀居高不下，经济增速迟缓，两者结合表现出其潜在的极限速度大大低于人们的意料。印度得情况也是一样得，曾经近两位数的年均GDP 增速让政治家和众多投资者们，仰仗着印度年青的劳动力以及贫穷的人口，一时分不清什么是快速赶超的潜力，什么是快速赶超的必然性。印度的增速有可能再次起飞，但是必须得实施彻底的改革，不过就算起飞也肯定达不到2000-2010年之间的巅峰水平。
Many laps ahead
漫漫前路
The Great Deceleration means that booming emerging economies will no longer make up for weakness in rich countries. Without a stronger recovery in America or Japan, or a revival in the euro area, the world economy is unlikely to grow much faster than today's lacklustre pace of 3%. Things will feel rather sluggish.
经济大减速意味着欣欣向荣的新兴经济体再也无法弥补发达国家的疲软。美国和日本的经济若不能更强势地复苏，欧盟区若不能实现复兴，要世界经济的增速超过3%这个萎靡不振的速度，几乎是不太可能。到那时，进程将会相当缓慢。
It will also become increasingly clear how unusual the past decade was (see article). It was dominated by the scale of China's boom, which was peculiarly disruptive not just as a result of the country's immense size, but also because of its surge in exports, thirst for commodities and build-up of foreign-exchange reserves. In future, more balanced growth from a broader array of countries will cause smaller ripples around the world. After China and India, the ten next-biggest emerging economies, from Indonesia to Thailand, have a smaller combined population than China alone. Growth will be broader and less reliant on the BRICs (as Goldman Sachs dubbed Brazil, Russia, India and China).
我们会越来越明白，过去十年的表现是有多么不同寻常。中国的繁荣程度主宰了世界经济大势，除了体量大，出口增长猛烈，商品需求迫切，以及外汇储备雄厚等特点都让中国带给世界的冲击尤为强烈。日后，更多的国家实现的更均衡的增长会减少世界经济的动荡。继中国和印度之后的十大新兴经济体，从印度尼西亚到泰国，它们的人口全部加起来都比不上中国一个国家。实现增长的范围会更广，对金砖四国(高盛所称的“巴西，俄罗斯，印度和中国”四国)的依赖度也会降低。
Corporate strategists who assumed that emerging economies were on a straight line of ultra-quick growth will need to revisit their spreadsheets; in some years a rejuvenated, shale-gas-fired America may be a sprightlier bet than some of the BRICs. But the biggest challenge will be for politicians in the emerging world, whose performance will propel—or retard—growth. So far China's seem the most alert and committed to reform. Vladimir Putin's Russia, by contrast, is a dozy resource-based kleptocracy whose customers are shifting to shale gas. India has demography on its side, but both it and Brazil need to recover their reformist zeal—or disappoint the rising middle classes who recently took to the streets in Delhi and São Paulo.
认为新兴经济体呈超快速直线增长的公司战略家需要重新审阅下自己的试算表;再过几年，因页岩油而重新迸发生机的美国都比金砖四国中的几个国家更值得押注。但是，发展中国家最大的挑战，将要由各国的政客承担，他们的表现要不就促增长，要不就阻增长。目前为止，似乎中国警觉度最高，改革的步伐最坚定。与之鲜明对比的是普金统治下的俄国，它是一个萎靡不振，以能源为基础的盗贼主义国家，它的客户都开始转向页岩油了。印度有人口优势，但是它和巴西都需要找回各自的改革热情，不然日益增长的中产阶级会备感失望。最近德里和圣保罗都爆发了中产阶级组织的街头游行。
There may also be a change in the economic mood music. In the 1990s “the Washington consensus” preached (sometimes arrogantly) economic liberalisation and democracy to the emerging world. For the past few years, with China surging, Wall Street crunched, Washington in gridlock and the euro zone committing suicide, the old liberal verities have been questioned: state capitalism and authoritarian modernisation have been in vogue. “The Beijing consensus” provided an excuse for both autocrats and democrats to abandon liberal reforms. The need for growth may revive interest in them, and the West may even recover a little of its self-confidence.
经济发展的旋律还是有可能转调。二十世纪九十年代，“华盛顿共识”向新兴经济体经济大肆宣扬了自由和民主，虽然教育的方式有时居高临下。在过去的几年中，中国迅猛增长，而华尔街却遭受重挫，华盛顿陷入僵局，欧元区慢性自杀，这样的情况下，原来的自由真理受到质疑：国家资本主义和中央权威的现代化已经成为一种时尚。“北京共识”为独裁者和民主者都提供了一个摒弃经济自由化改革的借口。但是，对增长的需求会唤起他们对自由化改革的兴趣，发达国家甚至有可能找回一点自信心。
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